TALKING TURKEY AT THE IMF
By
Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, Ph.D.
Minaret
of Freedom Institute
One
element in the raging debate over globalization is the role of the IMF in the
ever-mounting debt of so much of the world.
The IMF has resisted calls from those who want the debts of the world’s
poorest countries to be forgiven outright with the objection that to reward
those who have most mismanaged their economies constitutes a “moral
hazard.” This cannot be denied. Is it not also a “moral hazard,” however, to
repeatedly restructure loans and make partial forgiveness in a seemingly
endless series of programs that repeatedly fail?
The
issue is a shadow not only over poor nations.
Even Turkey, a country with an economy that is in many respects dynamic,
has undergone crises within the past year that raise questions about its future
stability, both economic and political.
Three years ago Turkey negotiated a three-year stabilization program
whose goals were “to reduce inflation to single digits by 2002, ensure a
sustainable fiscal position, remedy chronic structural inefficiencies in the
economy, and raise the sustainable levels of growth” (Schaeffer 2001a). As with all previous arrangements with the
IMF the result was economic crises (one in November 2000, one in February
2001).
Turkish
inflation has frequently been in the unacceptable area of 80-100% per
year. In order avoid spending more than
the government was taking in, a common sparkplug of the poor monetary policy
that drives inflation, Turkey met its obligation to the IMF to reduce budget
deficits not by the politically difficult (though in the long run more sound)
method of reducing spending, but by the politically expedite method of raising
taxes. This unsurprisingly slowed the
economy. The IMF proposed devaluation
of Turkey’s currency to stimulate growth (Schaeffer 2001a).
What
happened next should have been predictable from similar experiences in the
Mexican and Southeast Asian economic crises (but the IMF never seems to
learn). The Turkish central bank lost
approximately $7 billion defending the government’s peg of the exchange rate
before finally giving in to market forces on February 21 and allowing the currency
to “float.” The result was a 50% drop
in value against the dollar over the succeeding months. During the time the government stubbornly
attempted to peg the price, however, speculators made easy profits “borrowing
foreign currency at low interest rates in order to buy government debt at much
higher interest rates…. Then, when the peg collapsed, the already weak banking
system was left with a drastically increased foreign currency debt” (Schaeffer
2001a).
Now
the state is bailing out thirteen acquired private banks and the state banks. The debt is 13% of the gross domestic
product. George Bush has kicked in a
$13 billion dollar bailout in exchange for “a priori reforms” (Schaeffer
2001b). The IMF has approved an $8
billion loan (in addition to an existing $6 billion loan from last year’s
bailout attempt) “after the Turkish
parliament passed radical laws to reform the corruption-plagued banking sector
… and to privatize debt-ridden state companies…” (Western Policy Center 2001). Does this mean the end of the cycle? Don’t believe it. Although economy minister Kemal Dervis has proposed 15 reform
measures, the sequence of their implementation places less important reforms
before the most critical ones, which may never be implemented.
The
Turkish elites fear that certain reforms may somehow be seen as softening their
stance against the Kurds or giving in to demands from the Islamist
movement. The corruption issue has been
an especially strong drawing card for the Islamists in the past. John Hulsman (2001), an analyst for the
Heritage Foundation professed, “I don't fear an Islamic government. I fear a grumpy Turkey.”
The
February crisis was sparked by a flare-up between President and Prime Minister
over the fact that officials accused of corruption were still in office. If Turkey is to get rid of the corruption,
it is insufficient to fire corrupt officials; it must get rid of the policies
that induce corruption. Foremost among
these must be liberalization of the economy and a reduction in government
spending.
Hulsman,
John 2001. “Turning Point for Turkey”,
Heritage Foundation Seminar (Washington, DC June 14).
Schaefer,
Brett D. 2001a “Turkish Crisis Creates Opportunity for Needed Economic
Reform.” The Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum #273 (Feb. 28).
Schaefer,
Brett D. 2001b. “Turning Point for
Turkey.” Heritage Foundation Seminar (Washington, DC June 14).
Western
Policy Center 2001. “Turkey: Bush
Administration Conditions, Bailout on Economic reforms.” The Strategic Regional Report. 6 #4 (May-June).